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1 Introduction
Unilateral carbon pricing by one country or region is likely to distort trade and give rise to
carbon leakage (Fowlie et al., 2016). Regional schemes like the European Union’s (EU) Emis-
sion Trading Scheme (ETS) partially mitigate this by agreeing a uniform carbon price for some
industries (the covered sector responsible for about half the total EU’s emissions). While this
should reduce the distortions within the EU, it is still prone to leakage to the rest of the world.
The main industries affected by carbon leakage are carbon-intensive traded goods such as steel,
aluminium and cement. Fowlie et al. (2016) choose US cement for a case study as it has ex-
perienced up to 20% import penetration, and is also highly concentrated. The electricity sector
is, however, considerably more carbon intensive. In the EU-28, electricity accounts for just
over 20% of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, with very little decrease since 1990, while
Figure 1 shows considerable fluctuations for the UK, remaining higher than the EU until the
recent sharp decrease as coal has been driven out of the system by increases in carbon prices.
Figure 1: UK CO2e emission from electricity sector as a share of total emissions, 1990-2018
The electricity sector is therefore of central importance when studying the impact of dif-
ferential carbon prices. It has the added advantage that electricity is not widely traded outside
the boundary of the EU, but within the EU, Great Britain (GB) faces potentially a 13% import
share (and an actual share of 6.4% in 2018). A study of differential carbon prices within EU’s
Integrated Electricity Market1 therefore isolates the impact, and allows us to ignore the rest of
the world, except for the impact on global emissions.2
This paper develops a methodology for quantifying the impact of an asymmetric carbon tax
on electricity trade within a closed region such as the EU or North America. The EU’s Third
1The EU’s Integrated Electricity Market opens national wholesale and retail electricity markets to trade and
competition across the EU.
2Electricity prices will feed through to other exporting industries and will give rise to some additional leakage,
but this will be ignored in the present paper.
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Electricity Package came into force in 2014, requiring market coupling of interconnectors.
Before market coupling, traders had to buy interconnector volume and direction before knowing
the market clearing price at each end, often resulting in inefficient trades. Market coupling
ensured that interconnector capacity would be cleared at the same time as electricity markets,
securing efficient trade. If market prices can be equilibrated without violating interconnector
capacity constraints, prices at each end will be the same. Otherwise, trade will be set at full
capacity and prices will diverge. Figure 4 shows the effect of coupling on the relationship
between cross-border electricity trading and day-ahead price differences (of the two connected
markets).
GB, The Netherlands and France have all been coupled since early 2014, while the inter-
connector between GB and the Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland (comprising
Northern Ireland, part of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland) was only coupled in October
2018. The interconnector linking GB to Belgium was not commissioned until 2019. We there-
fore restrict our study to GB’s trade with France and The Netherlands from early 2014 to late
2018, before these other linkages became coupled.
In 2011, the UK Government decided to enact a gradually escalating Carbon Price Floor for
fossil generation fuels to make low-carbon generation investment commercially viable. This
came into effect in April 2013 and took the form of a carbon tax (the Carbon Price Support,
CPS, an addition to the EU carbon price, see Figure 2) on generation fuels in GB (but not
Northern Ireland). This paper quantifies the costs and benefits of cross-border electricity trad-
ing between interconnected countries in the presence of asymmetric distortionary carbon taxes.
It takes GB as a case study and quantifies the impact of the CPS on electricity prices, inter-
connector flows, congestion income (from buying low and selling high), and social value from
trade. It also estimates the deadweight loss and carbon leakage in the electricity sector created
by the asymmetric carbon taxes. This has implications for the design and ideally harmonisation
of the EU carbon tax to improve the efficiency of electricity trade.
We estimate that over 2015-2018 when the CPS stabilised at £18 ( e20) /tCO2, the CPS
raised the GB day-ahead price by an average of e11.43/MWh (about 28% of the GB whole-
sale price) after allowing for replacement by cheaper imports. The CPS increased GB imports
by 12.4 TWh/yr (about 4% of the GB annual electricity demand), thereby reducing carbon tax
revenue by e101 m/yr (about 10% of the 2017 CPS tax receipts). The commercial value of
interconnectors (measured by congestion income) increased by e153 m/yr (by 80% relative to
the zero CPS case), half of which was transferred to foreign interconnector owners. The sum
of the congestion income and the importer and exporter surplus is the social value of intercon-
nector at e250 m/yr, but the asymmetric carbon taxes created deadweight losses of e80 m/yr,
about 4% of the global emissions reduction benefit of the CPS of e2 bn/yr. Increased French
exports raised French wholesale prices by 3.5% and Dutch wholesale prices by 2.8%. Finally,
about 1.3% of the CO2 emission reduction is undone by France (-0.4% by the Netherlands), and
the monetary loss of this carbon leakage is about e27 m/yr ( e-9 m/yr for The Netherlands),
in total e18 m/yr.
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1.1 Literature review
Previous literature has mostly focused on the impact of unilateral carbon taxes on the macro-
level bilateral trade and carbon leakage under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Elliott et al. (2010) use
a computable general equilibrium model to predict that countries uncommitted to the protocol
will undo 20% of the reduction made by the committed countries, and adding full border tax
adjustments would eliminate the leakage. Babiker (2005) uses a similar model to predict that
the leakage rate can be as high as 130%, resulting in higher global emissions. Aichele and
Felbermayr (2015) conduct an empirical ex-post evaluation of the protocol and find that the
committed countries have increased 8% of its carbon imports, and the emission intensity of their
imports has increased by 3%. Harstad (2012) argues that the solution to the market distortion
is to allow countries to trade their emission allowance.
Folie et al. (2016) look at the domestic distortions arising from the oligopolistic nature of
the cement market, where at high carbon taxes domestic market power is increased. Leakage
makes matters worse, and both effects can be counteracted by suitable policies, including a
Border Tax Adjustments (BTA), an export credit of the kind contemplated by the proposed Eu-
ropean Commission’s “Climate Law” (EC, 2019, p5). Metcalf (2008), in designing a politically
acceptable carbon tax for the US, proposes a BTA to offset trade distortions, and an earned in-
come tax credit designed to be distributionally neutral. Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) look at
environmental tax distortions in a closed economy, finding that a full corrective environmental
tax (that fully internalises the externality) would create additional distortions if there are other
distorting revenue-raising taxes, arguing for a lower than Pigouvian tax on such externalities.
As the GB carbon tax does not carry any BTA it can be expected to have distortionary impacts
on trade, while its interactions with the rest of the tax system will be ignored here (as demand
for electricity is assumed inelastic in the short run).
Studies of carbon taxes and electricity markets have so far focused on their price impact (e.g.
Wild et al., 2015; Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Freitas and Da Silva, 2013; Jouvet and Solier, 2013;
Kirat and Ahamada, 2011; Fell, 2010; Sijm et al., 2006; Guo and Castagneto Gissey, 2019), on
the fuel mix and greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Di Cosmo and Hyland, 2013; Chyong et al.,
2019; Staffell, 2017), and on investment decisions within the power sector (e.g. Richstein et
al., 2014; Green, 2018; Fan et al., 2010). Fabra and Reguant (2014) is perhaps the most useful
for this paper in that they employ a rich micro-level data set to establish that emissions taxes
are almost completely passed through to electricity prices, confirming the macro-econometric
estimates of Chyong et al. (2020).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no ex-post econometric estimation of the effect of a
carbon tax on cross-border electricity trade after market coupling, nor of the deadweight loss
involved when applying carbon taxes asymmetrically across two electricity markets.
2 The British Carbon Price Floor and Market Coupling
This section introduces the British Carbon Price Floor (CPF) and market coupling that are the
foundations of our empirical analysis. The CPF distorted cross-border electricity trade, while
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market coupling ensures that the high-price country always imports, facilitating our analysis
for the counterfactual results where the CPF is not applied.
2.1 The British Carbon Price Floor
We are interested in the asymmetry in carbon prices between GB and Continental countries to
which it is electrically interconnected. All these countries, together with GB until the end of
2020, were members of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and as such faced a common
carbon price. The EU ETS is a “cap and trade” model, with the cap set to limit the total
CO2 emissions from the covered sector within the EU. The 2008 financial crisis and increased
renewables targets reduced demand for allowances (EUAs), causing prices to fall, reaching their
lowest level in 2011. In response and as part of the evolving Electricity Market Reform, the UK
Government announced plans for a Carbon Price Floor (CPF) to come into effect in April 2013,
intended to make up for the failure of the EU ETS to give adequate, credible and sufficiently
durable carbon price signals. The CPF was implemented by publishing a GB3 Carbon Price
Support (CPS) added to the EUA price to increase it to the projected CPF. The CPS grew from
£4.94/tCO2 in 2013 to £9.55/tCO2 in 2014, and has been stabilised since 2015 at £18/tCO2.
Consequently, the total GB carbon cost rose from £5/tCO2 in early 2013 to nearly £40/tCO2
by the end of 2018. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the (nominal) GB and the EU carbon prices.
The two curves start diverging in 2013, with the gap becoming wider in 2014 and 2015. The
dashed line represents the GB carbon cost target when the CPF was announced. It was not until
late 2018 that the GB carbon cost finally met the initial trajectory, thanks to the reform of the
EU ETS, which introduced a Market Stability Reserve that removes excess EUAs and increases
its price (Newbery et al., 2019).
The CPS raises the cost of fossil-fuelled electricity generation. Figure 3 plots the 28-day
moving average of the day-ahead prices for GB, France, and The Netherlands, as well as the
price differences between the two connected markets. It also shows the variable cost (i.e.
the short-run marginal cost) for Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) with 54.5%4 thermal
efficiency with EUA prices included (CPS excluded) as a measure of Continental gas generation
costs.
In general, while GB prices are typically higher than Dutch prices, the CPS widens the
price differences between the two markets. French prices are much more volatile than the
others mainly because nearly 80%5 of its gross electricity generation comes from nuclear power
stations (in 2015), making its electricity system less flexible and resulting in more volatile
prices. Another reason for the high volatility is that French prices are very weather-sensitive
given their high domestic electrical heating load. During Q3-Q4 2016 and Q4 2017, France
experienced major nuclear outages, which explains the much higher French prices during those
periods. The variable cost for CCGTs partially explains the patterns of prices for the three
3Northern Ireland, which is part of the Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland, is exempt to preserve
an equal carbon price on the island.
4Measured at Lower Heating Value (LHV).
5From Eurostat at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/get-latest-energy-data-all-eu-countries.
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Source: Chyong, Guo and Newbery (2020).
Figure 2: Evolution of the European and GB carbon prices in power sector, £/tCO2
Figure 3: 28-day lagged moving average day-ahead prices, 2013-2017
markets, and best fits the dynamics of the Dutch price, where gas is the marginal fuel most of
the time.
2.2 Market Coupling
The day-ahead electricity markets in Great Britain (GB), France, and The Netherlands were
coupled from 4 February 2014. Following market coupling, bids to buy and offers to sell are
fed into a European-wide auction. Each market operator solves for its own area price at which
6
the area’s supply and demand equate. When different market prices across the interconnector
occur, cross-border electricity trade takes price, and either prices across the interconnector can
be equalised without violaring capacity constraints, or, if not, the capacity is fully used and
prices remain divergent.
(a) Pre-coupling, 2013 (b) Post-coupling, 2017
Figure 4: Day-ahead flows v.s. price differences between GB and France, 2013 and 2017
Figure 4 plots the relationship day-ahead flow (exports shown as negative) and price dif-
ferences between GB and France for the entire year of 2013 and 2017, before and after the
market coupling. The two countries are connected by four cables of 500 MW each for a total
of 2 GW, hence the horizontal bands of observations at multiples of 500 MW are due to one
or more cables under maintenance or network limitations. In 2013, before the market coupling
(Figure 4a), capacity was inefficiently used with many inefficient power exchanges (dots in the
second and fourth quadrants), while after the market coupling (Figure 4b) available capacity
was efficiently used with no inefficiency.6
3 Theoretical Foundation
Consider two EU countries H (Home country, GB) and F (Foreign country) connected via
an interconnector with capacity K. Without the CPS (but with the EUA price), wholesale
electricity prices in each country are initially pi0, i= {H,F} (subscript j = 0 indicates without
the CPS, and 1 with). The net import to H over the interconnector is m j (−K ≤ m j ≤ K).
Applying the CPS (τ > 0) in H raises its wholesale price by ∆pH . The higher price in H
induces more net imports (∆m ≥ 0), which further changes generation in each country, with
impacts on marginal costs in H and F and in turn wholesale prices. Our first aim is to estimate
∆pH , ∆m and pi0, i = {H,F},7 with the estimate on ∆pH further informing us about the CPS
6The day-ahead flow that allocates capacity to the day-ahead market can differ from the final recorded cross-
border physical flows because of intraday and balancing trades, although these are typically less than 5% of the
total, so we focus on the day-ahead market as the only fully coupled market so far. The day-ahead prices are
representative of the wholesale electricity price.
7pi1, i = {H,F} are observed. Note pH0 +∆pH ≥ pH1 , because ∆pH measures the effect of the CPS on H’s
wholesale price with the net import fixed at m0, while pH1 is H’s wholesale price after considering the change in
net import ∆m.
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pass-through rate to H’s wholesale prices.
As demand is assumed inelastic and as changes in prices and imports have no obvious
impact in that hour’s intermittent renewable 8 and nuclear power generation, residual demand
(total demand minus renewable and nuclear generation) does not change with the carbon price.
Therefore, increased net imports imply the same reduction (increase) in fossil generation in H
(F).9 These supply changes, given the asymmetry in carbon taxes, will have first order welfare
effects. Our second aim to measure this welfare loss.
The changes in trading patterns potentially influence emissions in H and F , with impli-
cations for global emissions and welfare. The third aim is to estimate the carbon leakage of
the CPS via interconnectors, as well as the total CO2 emission reduction and its associated
monetary value (in a world in which individual country changes lead to global changes).10
This section builds the theoretical foundation of our later empirical analysis. Our analysis
is conducted hour by hour (not subscripted), and then aggregated over years.11 For simplicity,
we temporarily ignore the losses associated with the physical flow on the interconnector, but
take them into account in the empirical analysis.
3.1 The CPS cost pass-through
Adding the CPS raises short-run marginal costs of electricity generation, but generators in H
may absorb some of the tax by marking up their offers by a smaller or larger amount if the
market is imperfectly competitive, depending on the shape of the residual demand curve. In
this case and in the absence of any cross-border trade, the cost pass-through of the CPS would
then differ 100%. Under proportional mark-up pricing (Newbery and Greve, 2017) any cost
shock would also be marked up, and the cost pass-through would be more than 100%.
Our post-econometric analysis allows us to estimate ∆pH , the increase in the GB wholesale
price when no trading takes place. This enables us to measure the domestic cost pass-through as
a percentage of the system marginal cost increase. A pass-through rate significantly different
from 100% would cast doubt on the competitive assumption and possibly change domestic
deadweight losses as output responds to the CPS. We put this to one side for the moment.
In a closed competitive market, assume that coal and gas are the only marginal fuels. At the
margin, the short-run marginal costs (SRMC) of generating electricity from coal and gas (the
EUA cost included) are cC and cG respectively, assumed unchanged by the CPS. Without the
8Increased exports might allow an increase in constrained-off surplus wind, but these are only likely when the
country is already exporting and limited by interconnector capacity.
9In the very short run, it may induce changes in the pattern of storage, but assuming that storage is efficiently
used over the course of the day its total will not change and so will not affect the argument.
10The Market Stability Reserve removes the surplus EUAs, making reduction by one country effectively a
reduction of global CO2 emissions. Given this, the EU ETS operates as a carbon tax, for which this assumption
would be valid.
11Output and trade are only measured for hours with positive fossil generation in the Home country, as there
can only be changes in the residual demand and import in such periods. In periods of surplus foreign renewables
the Foreign residual demand is constrained to zero, m0 = K and again there will be no change in imports with the
CPS and so such periods will also be excluded.
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CPS, if the marginal share of coal is α0, the electricity price in H is the system SRMC:
pH0 = α0cC+(1−α0)cG. (1)
The CPS (τ , e/tCO2) raises the system SRMC. If τ switches the merit order and hence the
marginal share of fossil fuels, H’s system SRMC with τ is
pH1 = α1(cC+ eC · τ)+(1−α1)(cG+ eG · τ), (2)
where α1 is the marginal share of coal with the CPS, and eC and eG are emissions per megawatt
hour of electricity (MWhe) generated by marginal coal and gas. In this closed competitive
market, the CPS has raised the electricity price by
pH1 − pH0 = τ · [α1 · eC+(1−α1) · eG]+ (cC− cG) · (α1−α0)
= τ ·µH1 +(cC− cG) ·∆α,
(3)
where µH1 = [α1 · eC+(1−α1) · eG] denotes the Marginal Emission Factor (MEF, the CO2 re-
leased from the last unit of electricity generated in MWhe/tonne CO2) of H with the CPS
applying, and ∆α = α1−α0 is the change in the marginal share of coal.
Equation (3) suggests that if the CPS does not change the marginal share of coal and ∆α = 0,
or if the SRMCs of coal and gas are close without the CPS and cC− cG ≈ 0, the impact of the
CPS on the domestic electricity price would be µH1 · τ . Otherwise, given that normally coal is
the cheaper fuel without the CPS (cC−cG< 0), and that from Chyong et al. (2020) the marginal
share of coal has decreased with the CPS (∆α < 0), the impact of the CPS on the electricity
price should be higher than µH1 · τ . Using the data and results from Chyong et al. (2020), we
can estimate both (cC−cG) and ∆α , which enables us to further examine whether the CPS has
been fully passed through to the GB’s wholesale electricity price.
3.2 Impact on electricity trade
Interconnectors complicate this simple single market story. Without capacity limits, the in-
crease in H’s electricity price will change flows until the prices in both markets equate. With
capacity limit and if flows do not change due to an existing capacity constraint, there will be no
additional distortion. However, if flows do change, there will be additional deadweight losses.
If demand is inelastic, the deadweight loss will be the difference in the total cost of generation
with and without the CPS.
We use geometric expositions to clarify the problem, and distinguish five possible cases of
trade:
(a) trade is constrained without the CPS but is unconstrained with the CPS (H initially ex-
ports): pH0 < p
F
0 and p
H
1 = p
F
1 ;
(b) trade is constrained with and without the CPS, but the direction of trade changes: pH0 <
pF0 and p
H
1 > p
F
1 ;
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(c) trade is unconstrained with and without the CPS: pHj = p
F
j ;
(d) trade is unconstrained without the CPS but constrained with the CPS: pH0 = p
F
0 and p
H
1 >
pF1 ;
(e) trade and its direction are unaffected by the CPS, as it is constrained by interconnector
capacity with and without the CPS: pHj > p
F
j , or p
H
j < p
F
j .
Figure 5: Impact of CPS on imports and deadweight losses, Case (a)
Figure 5 gives a geometric exposition of Case (a). Without the CPS, H’s net supply curve12
is represented by sH0 and F’s supply curve is represented by s
F
0 . H exports to F at the full inter-
connector capacity m0 =−K, with H’s prices (pH0 ) lower than F’s prices (pF0 ) and congestion
income equalling to R0 = (pH0 − pF0 ) ·m0, or the rectangle AGHF.13 Under the assumption of
zero consumer demand elasticity (i.e. vertical demand curves), the interconnector creates an
initial surplus (gains from trade) which is entirely due to a reduction in F’s generation costs (the
area under F’s net supply curve from D to F), offset by an increase in H’s cost (the area under
H’s net supply curve from C to A), or the area of the trapezium ACDF, made up of importer’s
and exporter’s surplus (triangles DFH and ACG, respectively) and the congestion income with-
out the CPS (rectangle AGHF). Given the slopes of the net supply curves are, over the relevant
range, θH and θF respectively for H and F , the social value of trade (when there is nothing to
distort trade) is thus
S=
1
2
· (θH+θF) ·m20+m0 · (pH0 − pF0 ). (4)
With the CPS, H’s supply curve shifts upward to sH1 . Although H is still exporting, the
interconnector is now uncongested and the net import increases by ∆m. The deadweight loss is
defined as the difference between F’s increased generation cost (the area under F’s net supply
12supply from fossil fuels.
13The congestion income is the arbitrage gain from buying low and selling high, defined as the product of the
interconnector flow and price difference between H and F .
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curve from F to E) and H’s reduced generation cost (the area under H’s net supply curve from
A to B). Given θH and θF , the deadweight loss is the trapezium ABEF, made up of triangles
EFJ and ABI and rectangle AIJF. Algebraically,
L=
1
2
· (θH+θF) ·∆m2+∆m · (pF0 − pH0 ). (5)
In this case, there is no congestion income with the CPS applying, hence change in conges-
tion income is
∆R= (pF1 − pH1 ) ·m1− (pF0 − pH0 ) ·m0, (6)
where in this case, pF1 − pH1 = 0.
In Case (b)-(e) similar arguments apply. The social value of the interconnector is due to
a reduction in F’s generation costs offset by an increase in H’s cost where there is no trade
distortion, and the deadweight loss is the difference between F’s increased generation cost and
H’s reduced generation cost following the unilateral carbon tax. Finally, the congestion income
is the product between price differences and flows. Appendix A.3 gives detailed explanation
for each case.
To sum up, in all cases the social value can be expressed as equation (4), the deadweight
loss from the trade distortion can be expressed as equation (5), and the change in congestion
income can be expressed as equation (6). Given this, both the social value and deadweight
losses are (linearly) positively correlated with the price difference where the CPS is not applied,
and (quadratically) positively correlated with the interconnector capacity (which determines the
magnitudes of m0 and ∆m). The change in congestion income would depend on flows and price
differences with and without the CPS.
3.3 Global impact
The CPS has substantially reduced domestic CO2 emissions from electricity. However, changes
in trade between H and F could potentially undo some part of H’s CO2 emission reduction. For
simplicity, assume that the fuel mix and the marginal fuel shares abroad do not change with net
exports (i.e. they are unaffected by the CPS). This would be plausible if there were no internal
transmission constraints on the Continent, as changes in their exports would be a very small
fraction of total generation. Given this, the foreign country’s MEF (µF ) remains unchanged
and the slope of its net supply curve is also unchanged. Also assume that the CPS has little
short-run impact on non-EU countries other than through changing global emissions.
∆W is the change in global welfare that increases from a fall in total emissions. If the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC)14 is C, and deadweight loss is L defined in (5), then,
∆W = (∆E+ ε) ·C−L (7)
where ∆E denotes the emission reduction due to changes in H’s fuel mix (holding imports
14The SCC is defined as the present discounted social cost of the damage caused by emitting one tonne of
carbon (more usually measured per tonne of CO2).
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fixed), and ε denotes the emission reductions due to H’s increased import from F . Chyong
et al. (2020) uses a Unit-Commitment Dispatch model to give estimates of GB’s emission
reduction from CPS in 2015 while holding imports fixed, while in this study we focus on the
second part of emissions reduction, ε . With the CPS, the MEFs are µH1 and µ
F , so the emission
reduction from trading is
ε = (µH1 −µF) ·∆m. (8)
The next challenge is to identify the effective SCC. The US estimate ranges from $201814/tCO2
(5th percentile, uprated by the CPI) to $2018130/tCO2 (95th percentile) with an average at 3%
discount rate of $201845( e38)/tCO2 (US EPA, 2016). At the lower discount rate preferred
by Stern Review (2006) and many others, the SCC would be higher. The UK Government’s
figure15 for sectors not covered by the ETS (i.e. the full SCC) in 2020 was £201870 (e79)/tCO2.
The 2019 average GB carbon price for fossil generation was e45/tCO2, greater than both
the average US SCC and the EU ETS level of e20/tCO2. Even if the 2019 GB price is
considered a defensible SCC, from 2013 the annual average GB price has steadily risen from
e8.23/tCO2 at which level it would be considerably below the US SCC. In our analysis, to
calculate the global surplus from the CPS, we take the 2019 British carbon price as the SCC,
i.e. C = e45/tCO2. Clearly it is simple to adjust ∆W for other values of the SCC, C.
3.4 Other distributional impacts
There are other distributional impacts from the CPS. As prices increase in both countries, some
producers gain and consumers lose.16 In the home country, the government receives additional
tax revenue from the CPS, and both countries receive EUA revenues that change with output.
Estimating these distributional impacts requires knowledge about market structures of both
markets, and perhaps simulation techniques are preferable to econometric methods. We leave
their estimation for future research.
4 Econometric Models
This section presents the econometric specifications to study the impact of interconnector flows
and the British CPS on the domestic and foreign day-ahead electricity prices. The period for
our econometric analysis starts on 4 February 2014, when the North-Western Europe market
coupling went live, to 30 September 2018, when GB first became coupled with the island
of Ireland. During this period, no new interconnectors were commissioned, and the capacity
of fossil plants, especially coal, was stable in GB, France, and The Netherlands. Over the
period, the British CPS rose from £4.94/tCO2 to £9.55/tCO2 and then stabilised at £18/tCO2,
providing a sufficient number of observations for different levels of the CPS. Data availability17
15https://www.forestresearch.gov.uk/research/review-of-approaches-to-carbon-valuation-discounting-and-risk-
management/current-uk-government-guidance-for-social-value-of-carbon/
16H’s marginal fossil suppliers may not gain from the higher domestic wholesale price but H’s other suppliers
will gain.
17We are unable to obtain the Dutch day-ahead or actual wind and load data for the period before 2015.
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makes IFA, the interconnector between GB and France, the main focus, though we provide
some less reliable estimates for BritNed, the link between GB and the Nertherlands. This
section introduces the simplest specification with neither peak and off-peak heterogeneity nor
interaction terms. ISection 6 gives the simple results and also examines heterogeneity between
peak and off-peak and includes interaction terms.
One of our major challenges in estimating the impact of flows on electricity prices is that
the day-ahead market is an implicit auction, which means the domestic and foreign prices
and the interconnector flows are determined simultaneously, raising the issue of simultaneity.
Finding proper instrumental variables for the day-ahead flows is difficult because under market
coupling, the day-ahead flows are only determined by the day-ahead price differences, i.e. the
dependent variables. To circumvent this issue, in the post-estimation part we use the marginal
effects of wind on prices as proxies for the marginal effects of flows. Changes in imports should
be similar to changes in wind generation in their impact on fossil generation.
As electricity supply has to meet demand at every moment, prices are highly volatile. To
deal with this, we implement the Multivariate Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional Het-
eroskedasticity (M-GARCH) model (Silvennoinen and Tera¨svirta, 2008), which accounts for
variations in both the mean and volatility of electricity prices. M-GARCH has been widely
used to model day-ahead electricity prices (e.g. Kirat and Ahamada, 2011; Anna-Phan and
Roques, 2018).
As hourly electricity prices in most European countries for the next day are all set simulta-
neously in the pan-European day-ahead auction, the data generation process of the prices indi-
cates that it would be problematic to treat them as univariate time series with hourly frequency.
For the same reason, within a day the price for any hour does not carry much information about
the next hour (Keppler, 2014; Wu¨rzburg et al., 2013; Sensfuss et al., 2008). Therefore, for each
country we aggregate to give daily averaged day-ahead prices. For our main case the mean
equation of the M-GARCH model is
yt = µ +ΓX t+ε t , yt =
(
PGBt ,P
FR
t
)′
, (9)
where yt is a vector of day-ahead GB and French prices, and t represents days. X t is a k× 1
vector of exogenous covariates, including the day-ahead forecast18 of wind and nuclear genera-
tion for both countries, electricity load (i.e. demand) for both countries, coal and gas prices, the
EUA price, the day-ahead scheduled interconnector capacity and most importantly, the British
CPS. We also include dummy variables representing the days of the week and the quarters of
the year.19
We do not include auto-regressive terms of the dependent variables in the regression be-
cause first, the electricity wholesale markets in GB and France are workably competitive (CMA,
2016; Pham, 2015). This means that bidding behaviour is primarily driven by the short-run
18Whenever the forecast data is unavailable, we use the actual data as a proxy.
19The yearly dummy variables are not included mainly because it can substantially save computational time,
especially for the more complicated specifications such as Regression (iii) in Table 2. Also, almost all covariates
carry information of (yearly) trends and drifts (if any), which weakens the importance of the yearly dummies.
Lastly, including yearly dummies in the regressions have negligible effects on the estimation results.
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marginal cost, instead of the market outcome from days before. Second, including day-of-
week dummy variables allow us to effectively capture the difference in price patterns between
weekdays and weekends. The reason that the lagged fuel and carbon prices are also excluded
from the model is that the market participants in both GB and France have many years of
experience, and can observe the daily prices of each before making their bids.
All covariates can be treated as exogenous. Wind generation depends on weather, and
electricity load is inelastic to prices in the short-run (Clo` et al., 2015). Nuclear generation is
also exogenous as it runs unless an outage occurs.20 Although some studies have found that
dynamic interactions among fuel, carbon, and electricity prices may play an important role in
price formation (Knitell and Roberts, 2005), we argue that fuel and carbon costs (EUA prices
in this case) are more likely to be affected by the EU-wide demand by the much larger covered
sector for EUAs, a claim supported statistically by Guo and Castagneto Gissey (2019). The
authors also find the exchange rate between Euro and Sterling is exogenous with respect to
electricity prices. Finally, the scheduled interconnector capacity is only influenced by outages,
maintenance or network limitations and so can also be treated as exogenous.
We expect wind and nuclear generation to reduce electricity prices and load to raise prices.
As GB has consistently been a net importer of electricity from the Continent, we expect in-
terconnector capacity to lower the GB price and raise foreign prices. We also expect the fuel
and EUA prices to raise electricity prices. The impact of fuel and the EU carbon costs on elec-
tricity prices depends on the (marginal) fuel mix in the market. During 2013-2017, fossil fuel
provided more than 80% of GB’s marginal generation (Chyong et al., 2019; Staffell, 2017),
while the marginal generation in France has heavily relied on hydro and imports. Therefore,
one might expect fuel costs and EUA prices to have a stronger impact on the GB price than the
French price. However, marginal imports of France come from in other fossil-fuel intensive
Continental markets (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Spain and Italy), which could also influence the
French price, potentially boosting the effect of fuel and EUA prices on the French price.
Our estimates of the impact of the CPS on the prices are conditional on interconnector
capacity but unconditional on interconnector flows, meaning that the coefficients for the CPS
can only be interpreted as the estimates of the diluted (by trade) impact of the CPS on both
GB and French prices. As other EU countries have not yet introduced a carbon tax similar to
the CPS, the higher GB carbon tax result in foreign countries exporting more electricity to GB,
which in turn lowers the GB price and raises the foreign price. We therefore expect the CPS to
have positive impacts on both GB and French prices, though its effect on the GB price should
to be much higher.
To control for dynamic heteroskedasticity, we assume ε t to be conditionally heteroskedas-
tic:
ε t =H
1/2
t η t (10)
given the information set It−1, where the 2×2 matrixH t = [σ2i j,t ],∀i, j= 1,2, is the conditional
covariance matrix of ε t . η t is a normal, independent, and identical innovation vector with zero
20Although the French nuclear power may reduce output off-peak, aggregating the hourly observations to daily
can effectively deal with the potential endogeneity.
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means and a covariance matrix equalling to the identity matrix, i.e. Eη tη ′t = I .
We use the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC)21 GARCH(1,1) model proposed by
Bollerslev (1990), where the conditional correlation matrix, H t , can be expressed as:
H t =D
1/2
t RD
1/2
t , (11)
whereR= [ρi j] is a 2×2 time-invariant covariance matrix of the standardised residualsD−1/2t ε t .
R is positive definite with diagonal terms ρii = 1. Dt = [di j,t ] is a diagonal matrix consisting of
conditional variances with dii,t = σ2ii,t , and di j,t = 0 for i 6= j.
The model assumes the conditional variances for electricity prices follow a univariate GARCH(1,1)
process and the covariance between prices is given by a constant-correlation coefficient multi-
plying the conditional standard deviation of the price differentials:
σ2ii,t = si+αiε
2
i,t−1+βiσ
2
ii,t−1, (12)
σ2i j,t = ρi j
√
σ2ii,tσ2j j,t , (13)
where si is a constant term, α1 is the ARCH parameter capturing short-run persistence and β1
is the GARCH parameters capturing long-run persistence.
One advantage for the M-GARCH model is that it allows for the existence of missing data,
where the missing dynamic components are substituted by the unconditional expectations. The
model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation. As noted above, we assume no auto-
regressive terms. This saves considerable computational time by reducing the number of un-
known parameters.
5 Data
Table 1 gives summary statistics for all variables. The day-ahead price for France is collected
from Epex Spot, and the DAM price for GB comes from the Nord Pool Market Data Platform.
The French System Operator (RTE) provides forecasts of hourly French electricity load and
wind generation, as well as the actual hourly French nuclear generation. While we are unable
to find the day-ahead forecast of GB load and wind generation over the whole period, we
use the actual half-hourly data from National Grid as proxies. The half-hourly GB nuclear
generation is collected from the Elexon portal. ENTSO-E provides the day-ahead forecasted
transfer capacity of interconnectors. All (half-)hourly data are aggregated to daily averages.
The daily UK National Balancing Point (NBP) price22 and the EUA price are collected
from the InterContinental Exchange (theice.com), and the daily coal price is collected from the
CME group, representing coal prices at global level. In order to count in the transportation cost
of coal into power stations, quarterly averages of the daily prices are subtracted from the BEIS
21The Wald test suggests to use the CCC model instead of a more complicated Dynamic Conditional Correlation
(DCC) model, and both models provide very similar estimation results.
22An alternative is to use the Dutch natural gas price at the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) Virtual Trading Point.
However, as the European natural gas markets are rather liquid, the two natural gas prices are extremely close.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Unit Abbr. Mean S. D. Min. Max.
GB day-ahead price e/MWh PGB 53.80 9.72 33.33 199.98
French day-ahead price e/MWh PFR 39.86 14.82 2.98 125.92
IFA day-ahead capacity GW ICIFA 1.77 0.38 0.43 2.00
GB load GW DGB 31.31 4.44 20.82 42.91
French load GW DFR 53.36 10.62 34.82 87.97
GB wind GW WGB 2.97 1.92 0.14 10.16
French wind GW WFR 2.28 1.49 0.33 10.54
GB nuclear GW WGB 7.32 0.76 4.25 8.99
French nuclear GW WFR 44.93 6.37 29.94 60.61
CPS e/tCO2 CPS 19.36 4.99 5.88 26.06
Coal plant var. cost e/MWhe VCCOAL 28.19 4.48 17.44 37.79
Gas plant var. cost e/MWhe VCCCGT 34.50 6.75 20.29 54.47
EUA price e/tCO2 EUA 7.61 3.58 3.99 25.19
quarterly “average prices of fuels purchased by the major UK power producers”.23 The raw
coal price data is then adjusted by adding this margin.24 All fuel prices are first converted to
Euros per megawatt hours of heat ( e/MWhth) using daily exchange rates (from the real-time
FX). Then, assuming the thermal efficiency for coal-fired power plants is 35.6% and for CCGTs
is 54.5% (Chyong et al., 2019), we transform the fuel prices into e/MWhe, namely Euros per
megawatt hours of electricity generated.25 These are the variable costs (i.e. short-run marginal
cost) of electricity generated from coal and gas plants without counting in carbon prices.26 In
the rest of this paper, MWh and MWhe are used inter-changeably.
6 Results
In our regressions, outliers for day-ahead electricity prices are defined as values exceeding four
standard deviations of the sample mean and are removed and treated as missing data. Several
validity tests are applied. Wald tests examine whether the more complicated Dynamic Con-
ditional Correlation (DCC) models instead of the proposed Constant Conditional Correlation
(CCC) models are necessary (Tse and Tsui, 2002), and the test statistics suggest using CCC
models. Estimates of the correlation coefficients, ρi j in equation (11) are within the interval of
(−1,1), and estimates of the conditional variance matrices, H t ,∀t are positive definite, ensur-
ing the validity of the M-GARCH model. Table 2 presents the estimation results of the mean
23https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/790152/
table 321.xlsx
24We consider the UK coal price a much better proxy of the EU coal prices than the raw data from the CME
group.
25Dividing e/MWhth by the thermal efficiency gives e/MWhe.
26Although the day-ahead prices, variable costs, the EUA price, as well as the CPS (in Euro) are non-stationary
process, the Johansen tests suggest that the non-stationary variables are cointegrated. As a results, using levels
(instead of first differences) to run regressions will be consistent (Johansen and Juselius, 1990).
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equations.27
Table 2: M-GARCH results
Unit (i) (ii) (iii)
GB DAM prices Off Peak Off Peak
GB wind GW −0.881∗∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.162∗∗∗ −0.826∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.055) (0.036) (0.113) (0.078)
GB wind GW 0.873∗∗∗ −0.221∗
×CPS Dummy (0.114) (0.086)
French wind GW −0.054 −0.219∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.049) (0.063) (0.038) (0.057) (0.043)
IFA capacity GW −0.836∗∗∗ −0.071 −2.553∗∗∗ 0.134 −1.896∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.203) (0.145) (0.183) (0.207)
Coal price e/MWhe 0.345∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.021) (0.024) (0.016) (0.069) (0.056)
Coal price e/MWhe −0.145∗ 0.335∗∗∗
×CPS Dummy (0.063) (0.056)
Gas price e/MWhe 0.825∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.034) (0.034)
Gas price e/MWhe 0.201∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗
×CPS Dummy (0.041) (0.043)
EUA e/tCO2 0.507∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.214) (0.175)
EUA e/tCO2 −0.479∗ −0.565∗∗
×CPS Dummy (0.219) (0.178)
CPS e/tCO2 0.595∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.055) (0.046)
French DAM prices
GB wind GW −0.135 −0.226∗∗ −0.131 −0.238∗∗ −0.146∗
(0.076) (0.081) (0.070) (0.081) (0.070)
French wind GW −1.817∗∗∗ −1.896∗∗∗ −1.467∗∗∗ −1.898∗∗∗ −1.485∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.092) (0.083) (0.092) (0.083)
IFA capacity GW −0.674 −1.505∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗ −1.465∗∗∗ −0.942∗∗
(0.379) (0.314) (0.357) (0.312) (0.359)
Coal price e/MWhe 0.607∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Gas price e/MWhe 0.690∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
EUA e/tCO2 0.611∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.064) (0.069) (0.063) (0.068)
CPS e/tCO2 0.320∗∗∗ 0.046 0.098∗ 0.050 0.103∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
Nuclear outage YES YES YES YES
No. Obs. 1687 1684 1684
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p< 0.05, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
Regression (i) ignores the heterogeneity between peak and off-peak behaviour. We find the
estimated impact of the CPS on the French price is unexpectedly high: a e1/tCO2 increase
in the CPS is associated with a e0.32/MWh increase in the French price, more than a half of
its impact on the GB price. Further analysis reveals that even though we have controlled for
27The full results are listed in Table A.1.
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nuclear generation, the major French nuclear outages (in Q3-Q4 2016 and Q4 2017) have much
higher effects on the French prices than during normal outages, and ignoring this effect would
result in omitted variable bias.
As a result, in Regressions (ii) and (iii) we add a dummy variable representing periods of se-
vere French nuclear outages. Regressions (ii) and (iii) also separates the day into peak and off-
peak, hence yt of equations (9) now has four dependent variables (P
GB,P
t ,P
FR,P
t ,P
GB,O
t ,P
FR,O
t )
′,
namely the daily averaged peak and off-peak electricity prices for GB and France. Peak and
off-peak have different demands and fuel mix, so the marginal fuel could differ, resulting in
different marginal effects on electricity prices. Regression (iii) further adds interaction terms
between some of the existing covariates and a dummy variable equalling to one when the British
CPS was stabilised at £18/tCO2 (after April 2015). This is because the high CPS has switched
the merit order between coal and gas within the GB electricity dispatch (Chyong et al., 2020),
hence after April 2015, wind might displace different fuel types and have different effects on
the GB price. For the same reason, the marginal effects of fuel and the EUA prices on the GB
price could be different before and after April 2015.
From Regressions (ii) and (iii), we find evidence on both domestic and foreign wind low-
ering French prices, in agreement with Anna-Phan and Roques (2018). The intuition is that
higher foreign wind reduces foreign electricity prices, resulting in higher domestic net import,
which further reduces domestic prices. Although Regression (ii) suggests French wind has a
positive effect on the GB price during peak periods, the magnitudes is small and the effect
disappears in Regression (iii).
We find interconnector capacity of IFA reduces electricity prices in GB, as GB is con-
sistently a net importer from France. The effects are significantly different between peak and
off-peak, probably because GB has a convex and monotonically increasing marginal cost curve,
as illustrated in Appendix Figure A.2. During off-peak periods, the electricity system is run-
ning at base load with a relatively flat marginal cost curve, so a change in the interconnector
capacity (hence import) has little effect on the GB price.
Counterintuitively, we find interconnector capacity has a negative effect on French prices
as well, for rather complicated reasons. On the one hand, 80% of the French electricity comes
from nuclear power stations with close-to-zero marginal costs, and the French electricity market
is designed to be an exporter of electricity. Therefore, when the French nuclear stations are
producing with full capacity, its electricity supply curve is mostly flat. On the other hand, when
France is importing, it is likely because of high demand relative to nuclear output (cold weather,
nuclear outages). In those cases, due to its limited capacity of fossil fuels, the French marginal
cost curve can be steep where it meets demand, and importing (or increasing interconnector
capacity) can substantially reduce the French electricity price. As a result, one may observe
interconnector capacity substantially reducing the French prices, even though France exports to
GB most of the time. This is not the case between BirtNed’s capacity and the electricity price
of The Netherlands, who has a much smaller share of nuclear capacity in its electricity system,
as illustrated in Appendix A.7.
Electricity prices are positively correlated with both coal and gas prices. However, gas
prices are found to have a much stronger impact in GB than France because the GB electricity
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system relies more heavily on gas. This is especially the case after April 2015, when the
CPS has made the GB electricity supply less coal-dependent and more gas-dependent, while
in France coal remains relatively cheaper. For both countries, the marginal effects of gas are
significantly higher in peak than off-peak periods, consistent with Chyong et al. (2020), who
argue that because peak demand is more variable, the more flexible gas plants are preferred to
respond to wind and demand changes then.
As GB’s electricity generation is less carbon intensive thanks to the CPS, the EUA price has
positive but smaller effects on the GB price than the French price (well-connected to a fossil
hinterland). The CPS has a positive impact on the French price, consistent with GB importing
more electricity from France due to the CPS.
From regression (iii), the marginal effects of wind, fuel prices, and the EUA price are sub-
stantially different before and after the 2015 rise in the CPS. Before then, wind had a very
substantial effect on GB’s off-peak prices, while the high CPS made it less influential, suggest-
ing a much flatter marginal cost off-peak schedule after April 2015. Because the high CPS has
switched coal from base to the mid-merit load, coal is expected to have a stronger impact on the
peak than off-peak GB prices, and vise versa for gas. Our regression results are in agreement
with the theory and find that since April 2015, GB prices rely more heavily on coal during peak
periods and more heavily on gas during off-peak periods.
In the rest of this section, Subsections 6.1-6.3 utilises results from Regression (iii) to esti-
mate the counterfactual (i.e. with the CPS not applying) prices and flows of GB and France, the
CPS pass-through to the GB electricity price, and the trade distortion between GB and France.
Subsection 6.4 discusses the global impact of the CPS, and Subsection 6.5 gives a summary of
BritNed, the interconnector between GB and The Netherlands.
6.1 Estimating the counterfactual IFA flows
Table 2 gives the estimated impacts of wind and the CPS on the GB and French electricity prices
for both peak and off-peak periods. Appendix A.4 shows how the estimates from Regression
(iii) give the counterfactual prices and flows.
Table 3 summarises the average annual (electricity year from 1 April to 31 March) day-
ahead electricity prices of GB and France, GB’s net import, and congestion income. The dif-
ferences between the actual and the counterfactual cases are also listed (in the columns denoted
with ∆). The counterfactual for the electricity year 2014-2015 removes the CPS of £9.55/tCO2,
while the counterfactual for the electricity years 2015-2018 removes the CPS of £18/tCO2. The
final lines give the averages over 2015-2018.
The CPS increases the GB price and hence net imports, which mitigates the GB price rise
somewhat and (slightly) increases the French price. Over 2015-2018, the £18/tCO2 of CPS
has on average raised the GB price by e11.43/MWh (or by 28%) and the French price by
e1.37/MWh (or 3.5%).28 Perhaps unexpectedly, without the CPS, GB’s net imports for IFA
28This means, on average, a e1/tCO2 increase in the CPS is associated with a e0.06/MWh increase in the
French price, consistent with our estimates in Table 2. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the CPS
has no direct impact on the French price other than through trading via IFA in Step 2 of Appendix A.4.
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Table 3: IFA: the counterfactual prices, flows, and congestion income
Electricity GB Prices ( e/MWh) French Prices ( e/MWh)
years w. CPS w/o CPS ∆ w. CPS w/o CPS ∆
14-15 e52.22 e46.20 e6.02 e36.39 e35.69 e0.70
(0.44) (0.44) (0.06) (0.06)
15-16 e53.24 e40.40 e12.85 e34.49 e33.24 e1.25
(0.88) (0.88) (0.14) (0.14)
16-17 e51.76 e40.70 e11.06 e43.22 e41.93 e1.29
(0.77) (0.77) (0.12) (0.12)
17-18 e52.70 e42.31 e10.39 e42.21 e40.63 e1.58
(0.71) (0.71) (0.14) (0.14)
Ave.(15-18) e52.57 e41.14 e11.43 e39.97 e38.60 e1.37
(0.78) (0.78) (0.13) (0.13)
GB Net Import (TWh) Congestion Income (m e)
w. CPS w/o CPS ∆ w. CPS w/o CPS ∆
14-15 15.21 TWh 11.29 TWh 3.92 TWh e243 e164 e79
(0.33) (0.33) (5.04) (5.04)
15-16 15.52 TWh 8.55 TWh 6.97 TWh e303 e143 e160
(0.75) (0.75) (7.82) (7.82)
16-17 8.17 TWh 1.05 TWh 7.12 TWh e185 e130 e55
(0.61) (0.61) (1.44) (1.44)
17-18 11.32 TWh 2.57 TWh 8.75 TWh e194 e123 e70
(0.75) (0.75) (2.75) (2.75)
Ave.(15-18) 11.67 TWh 4.60 TWh 7.61 TWh e227 e132 e95
(0.70) (0.70) (3.76) (3.76)
Standard errors in parentheses.
during 2016-2018 would be close to zero, as the electricity prices between the two countries
would be close, caused by French nuclear outages in both winters of 2016 and 2017 and the as-
sociated high French prices. During 2015-2018, GB in total imported 23 TWh more electricity
from France as a result of the CPS, or about 65% of its actual net import from France. Finally,
because the CPS widened the price difference between the two countries, congestion income
has risen by e95 m/yr over 2015-2018. This congestion income mostly comes from British
consumers, and half of it is transferred to France, because the electricity system operator of
French owns half of IFA.
6.2 The CPS pass-through to the GB day-ahead price
The CPS increases the cost of electricity generation and raises GB’s day-ahead prices. In a
closed competitive economy, the ratio between the increase in the GB price and the increase
in the system marginal cost (due to the CPS, holding interconnector flows constant) is the CPS
pass-through to the GB day-ahead price. Equation (3) shows the increase in the system SRMC
is a function of the MEF with the CPS applying (µH1 ), the difference of the SRMCs between
20
coal and gas (cC− cG), and the change in the coal share at margin (∆α = α1−α0).
Using the data and results from Chyong et al. (2020), during electricity years 2015-2018
the MEFs (µˆ1) for peak and off-peak are 0.363 and 0.405, respectively.29 The change in the
marginal share of coal (∆̂α) during the period is -0.008 and -0.236 for peak and off-peak,
respectively.30 Finally, (cC−cG) is estimated to be− e0.323/MWh.31 Given this, the increase
in the system SRMC is e0.366/MWh for peak and e0.481/MWh for off-peak.
The impact of the CPS on the GB electricity price when there is no cross-border trade
from Appendix A.4 is estimated to be ∆̂pH = e0.635/MWh (s.e.=0.049) for peak periods and
∆̂pH = e0.346/MWh (s.e.=0.060) for off-peak periods.
Based on this, assuming the estimates from Chyong et al. (2020) has zero standard errors32
and are independent with this paper, the CPS pass-through rate to GB’s peak prices is 173%
with a 95% confidence interval of 147-200%, and to GB’s off-peak prices is 72% with a 95%
confidence interval of 47-96%. The weighted average is 133% with a 95% confidence interval
of 108-159%. The higher cost pass-through in peak periods compared to off-peak is consistent
with most empirical literature (e.g. Sijm et al., 2006; Jouvet and Solier, 2013; Fabra and
Reguant, 2014). Guo and Castagneto (2019) explain this as electricity utilities strategically bid
at lower-than SRMC rates during off-peak periods to stay dispatching to avoid the much higher
shut-down and re-start costs. On the other hand, to compensate the off-peak losses, utilities
need to bid higher-than SRMC rates during peak periods, as high demand and reduced residual
capacity allow them to exercise some market power.
Although we reject the null hypothesis that the average cost pass-through of the CPS is
100% at 5% significant level, if Chyong et al. (2020) have under-estimated the individual
fuel emissions factors, then our cost-pass through rates would be over-estimated. Fabra and
Reguant (2014) are unable to reject full pass-through except for off-peak hours, using more
detailed micro-data than this study.
6.3 Market distortion from IFA
We can use the counterfactual prices and flows estimated in Section 6.1 to estimate IFA’s social
value from trading and deadweight losses from asymmetric carbon taxes, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. In addition, we also estimate the UK Government’s losses in carbon-tax revenue from
the GB generation displaced by increased imports over IFA. (Details are presented in Appendix
A.5.)
29Chyong et al. (2020)’s period of estimation is 2012-2017 in the Appendix, here we assume the MEF for GB in
Q1 2018 is the same as that in Q1 2017. These estimated MEFs use rather low emission factors as they ignore any
upstream emissions (from mine/well-head to power station). Using MEFs from other studies may give somewhat
different results.
30Chyong et al. (2020) demonstrate that the marginal share of coal/gas is a function of price differences between
the SRMC of coal and gas. The price differences is−e0.32/MWh without the CPS, and e11.55/MWh with CPS.
Given this, α0 = 0.356 for off-peak and 0.229 for peak; α1 = 0.120 for off-peak and 0.221 for peak.
31Precisely, using the notation in Table 1, SRMC j =VC j+ e j ·EUA, j ∈ {coal,ccgt}, where e j is the emission
factor which takes the value of 0.871 for coal and 0.337 for gas, consistent with Chyong et al. (2020).
32Chyong et al.’s estimates have much smaller standard errors, we assume that parameters whose values are
taken from them have zero standard error.
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Table 4: IFA: surplus, distortion and losses
Electricity Social Deadweight GB CPS Rev.
years Value (m e) Loss (m e) Loss (m e)
14-15 e209 e13.4 e20.2
(5.27) (2.10) (1.74)
15-16 e187 e39.8 e69.7
(8.03) (7.23) (7.52)
16-17 e164 e41.5 e55.7
(1.51) (6.32) (4.99)
17-18 e167 e46.0 e61.2
(2.95) (7.58) (5.37)
Ave. 15-18 e173 e42.4 e62.2
(3.80) (7.04) (5.93)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4 lists the social value, deadweight loss, and carbon-tax revenue loss. During 2015-
2018, the average deadweight loss from the trade distortion is e42.4 m/yr, about 24% the
average social value ( e173 m/yr). The average loss in the CPS tax revenue is e62.2 m/yr in
the case of IFA, or about 6% of the 2017 CPS tax receipts.
6.4 Carbon leakage and the impact on global welfare via IFA
From Section 3.3, IFA’s carbon emission reduction from the high import (ε) is determined by
the difference of the MEF between GB and France (µH1 −µF ) and the change in GB’s imports
from France (∆m). Appendix A.4 estimates the MEF for France is µˆF = 0.46, and Chyong et
al. (2020) provide the MEF for GB is µˆH1 = 0.38. Then, the carbon leakage to France is about
3.5 mtCO2/yr. In total, both country has emitted roughly 0.6 million tonnes more CO2 per year
due to the higher GB import. If we take the British carbon price in 2019 as the social cost of
carbon (C= e45/tCO2), the social cost of this increased emission is about e27 million.
Chyong et al. (2020) run a Unit-Commitment dispatch model of the 2015 GB power system
to estimate that the £18/tCO2 CPS reduces emission by 44.5 mtCO2/year. Thus about 1.3%
of the CO2 emission reduction from the CPS is undone by France. From equation (7), the
estimated total increase in global welfare from the CPS is about e2 bn/yr, hence the distortion
from IFA trade (i.e. the deadweight loss caused by the CPS) is only about 2% of this welfare
change.
6.5 BritNed: the interconnector between GB and The Netherlands
Appendix A.7 gives estimates of the impact of the CPS and wind on the GB and Dutch electric-
ity prices, and the estimated counterfactuals for BritNed. The CPS on average raised the Dutch
wholesale price by e1.02/MWh, or 2.8%. About 63% (4.77 TWh) of GB’s actual net import
from The Netherlands is due to the CPS, and congestion income almost doubled (from e59
m/yr to e117 m/yr). The social value of BritNed is about e77 m/yr, and the deadweight loss
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from unilateral carbon taxes is e39 m/yr, about half of the social value and about the same size
of the IFA loss (which is twice the capacity). The UK Government lost about e39.2 million in
carbon tax revenue, about 4% of its total CPF receipts in 2017.
Carbon leakage to The Netherlands is about 1.6 mtCO2/yr. Since gas is the marginal fossil
fuel in The Netherlands, the two countries’ total emission would actually be reduced by 0.2
mtCO2 per year compared with the zero CPS scenario. This reduction of CO2 emission is
worth about e9 m/yr, partly offsetting the French leakage.
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Market coupling ensures the efficient use of interconnectors so that the higher-price market
always imports electricity from the lower-price market. Unilateral carbon taxes distort trade
if they alter interconnector flows, resulting in deadweight losses. In all cases, carbon taxes
transfer revenue abroad at a cost to the domestic economy.
This paper investigated the impact of such carbon taxes on cross-border trade of electricity,
both theoretically and empirically. We show geometrically and analytically how the asymmetric
carbon tax distorts cross-border electricity trade, and discuss the global impact of the CPS.
Empirically, taking the British Carbon Price Support (CPS, a tax) as a case study, we estimate
the counterfactual (without the CPS) electricity prices and flows of the connected countries, and
further examine the impact of the CPS on GB’s net import and congestion income. In addition,
we also estimate the social value from cross-border electricity trading, the deadweight loss from
asymmetric carbon taxes, the carbon leakage due to untaxed imports, and the global emissions
impact of the CPS.
Our estimates show that during electricity years 2015-2018, the CPS increased the GB
day-ahead price by e11.43/MWh (about 28% of the GB wholesale price) after allowing for
displacement by cheaper imports. The CPS increased imports by 7.6 TWh/yr from France and
by 4.8 TWh/yr from The Netherlands (in total, about 4% of the GB annual electricity demand),
thereby reducing carbon tax revenue by e62 m/yr from IFA and by e39 m/yr from BritNed
(in total, about 10% of the 2017 CPS tax receipts). Congestion income for IFA was increased
by e95 m/yr and for BritNed’s by e58 m/yr (in total, by 80% relative to the zero CPS case).
The social value of interconnectoris around e173 m/yr for IFA and e77 m/yr for BritNed,
but the deadweight loss due to the CPS is e42 m/yr for IFA and e39 m/yr for BritNed. In
total, the deadweight loss from the CPS accounts for 4% of the global welfare gain from the
CPS (mainly from reduced coal burn in GB) at e2 billion/yr. The CPS has also raised the
French wholesale price by 3.5% and the Dutch wholesale price by 2.8%. As foreign electricity
does not yet bear a CPS, imports from France undo 1.3% of the CO2 emission reduction partly
compensated by -0.4% from The Netherlands (adding to net 0.9%), and the net social cost of
this leakage is about e18 m/yr.
The results confirm that the British CPS raised the GB spot price, reduced the convergence
of cross-border electricity prices and increased GB imports of electricity. Second, the increase
in congestion income (mostly) comes from GB electricity consumers but is equally allocated
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to both Transmission System Operators as owners of the interconnectors. This increased con-
gestion income could over-incentivise further investment in additional interconnectors, at least
to carbon-intensive markets lacking such carbon taxes. Third, following GB’s increased im-
ports, both French and Dutch day-ahead prices have increased somewhat. That raised their
producer surplus but increased consumer electricity costs. Fourth, the objective of the British
CPS is to reduce British CO2 emissions and incentivise low-carbon investment, but this is
partly subverted by increased imports of more carbon-intensive electricity from France. Fi-
nally, asymmetric carbon taxes in two connected countries incur deadweight losses, resulting
in less efficient cross-border trading.
Despite the CPS distorting cross-border electricity trading, it has significantly reduced GB’s
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation. On 21 April 2017, GB power generation
achieved the first-ever coal-free day. When the UK introduced the CPF, the hope was that
other EU countries would follow suit to correct the failures of the Emissions Trading System,
at least for the electricity sector. The case for such an EU-wide carbon price floor is further
strengthened by the desirability of correcting trade distortions.
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A Appendices
A.1 Load and Supply Curves
Figure A.1 shows the average daily load curves for GB, France, and The Netherlands during
2015-2018, at Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). To facilitate comparison, we standardise
each curve by dividing its hourly loads by its maximum load. The dashed vertical lines divide
the loads into peak and off-peak
Figure A.1: Standardised Daily Average Load Curves, 2015-2018, UTC
Figure A.2 plots an electricity market with a convex supply curve. During off-peak periods
when exports shift net demand from NDOFF0 to ND
OFF
1 , the spot price decreases by only a
small amount.
 
NDOFF1 NDOFF0 NDPEAK1 NDPEAK0 
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Figure A.2: A Market with a Convex Supply Curve
A.2 M-GARCH Rest of Table 2 for IFA
Table A.1 shows the M-GARCH results for other covariates and the ARCH and GARCH terms,
as a continuation of Table 2.
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Table A.1: M-GARCH Results (Cont’d)
Mean Equations
Unit (i) (ii) (iii)
Great Britain Off Peak Off Peak
(Constant) −6.249∗∗∗ −16.38∗∗∗ −5.064∗∗∗ −10.91∗∗∗ −4.147∗
(1.639) (1.932) (1.129) (2.100) (1.953)
GB load GW 0.470∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.078) (0.032) (0.071) (0.038)
French load GW 0.061∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ −0.053∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019)
GB Nuclear GW −0.884∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗ −0.502∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.789∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.117) (0.074) (0.108) (0.116)
French Nuclear GW −0.063∗∗ −0.060∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.062∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) (0.024)
France
(Constant) −29.45∗∗∗ −23.10∗∗∗ −33.21∗∗∗ −22.84∗∗∗ −32.55∗∗∗
(3.047) (2.699) (2.853) (2.748) (2.980)
GB load GW 0.156 0.000 0.303∗∗∗ −0.012 0.304∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.111) (0.067) (0.111) (0.067)
French load GW 1.022∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
GB Nuclear GW 1.023∗∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.167) (0.181) (0.172) (0.190)
French Nuclear GW −0.908∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ −0.574∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −0.578∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048)
Conditional Variance Equations
Great Britain
(Constant) 0.400∗∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗ 3.328∗∗∗ 2.227∗∗∗ 1.831∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.265) (0.239) (0.265) (0.284)
ARCH 0.308∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.065) (0.110) (0.069) (0.099)
GARCH 0.710∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ −0.001 0.282∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.043) (0.002) (0.043) (0.040)
France
(Constant) 6.331∗∗∗ 7.019∗∗∗ 5.204∗∗∗ 7.166∗∗∗ 5.428∗∗∗
(1.001) (0.912) (0.978) (0.919) (1.039)
ARCH 0.630∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.043) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037)
GARCH 0.244∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.060) (0.055) (0.060) (0.057)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p< 0.05, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
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A.3 Model Extension
Figure A.3: Impact of CPS on imports and deadweight losses, Case (b)
Figure A.3 presents Case (b). Similar to Cases (a), the deadweight loss is the trapezium
ACDF and L= 1/2 · (θH+θF) ·∆m2+∆m · (pF0 − pH0 ). The social value is the trapezium ABEF
and S= 1/2 · (θH+θF) ·m20+m0 · (pH0 − pF0 ).
The change in congestion income is also ∆R = (pF1 − pH1 ) ·m1− (pF0 − pH0 ) ·m0, where in
this case, m1 =−m0 = K.
Figure A.4: Impact of CPS on imports and deadweight losses, Case (c)
Figure A.4 presents Case (c), without the CPS, H’s net supply curve meets F’s net supply
curve at point A, with prices equalised (pH0 = p
F
0 ), no congestion income, and imports at m0.
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The social value is the triangle AEF, or S= 1/2 · (θH +θF) ·m20 and the deadweight loss is the
triangle ABD, or L = 1/2 · (θH +θF) ·∆m2. As the interconnector flow is unconstrained with
and without the CPS, there is no congestion income before or after and hence no change in
congestion revenue. In this case, equations (4)-(6) still apply, given pHj = p
F
j .
Figure A.5: Impact of CPS on imports and deadweigh losses, Case (d)
Figure A.5 presents Case (d), where exactly the same argument as Case (c) can be made.
The triangle ABD measures deadweight losses L and the triangle AEF measures social value S.
There is an increase in congestion income ∆R= (pH1 − pF1 ) ·m1, as shown in Figure A.5 as the
rectangle DGHI. Again, equations (4)-(6) still apply in this case given pH0 = p
F
0 .
In Case (e), there is no change in trade or output and hence no distortion, but as H’s prices
increase, so does the price difference pH1 − pF1 , with consequential changes in the congestion
income ∆R=m0 ·(pH1 − pH0 ). As a result, there will be a transfer of revenue from H’s consumers
to the foreign owners of the interconnectors, who, such as the French system operator, shares
50% of the interconnector revenue. Similar to Cases (a) and (b), the social from trading is also
S= 1/2 ·(θH+θF) ·m20+m0 ·(pH0 − pF0 ). Finally, given ∆m= 0 and pF0 = pF1 , equations (4)-(6)
still apply.
A.4 Estimating counterfactual flows
As before, superscripts H and F represent the Home and Foreign countries, and subscripts 1 and
0 are with and without the CPS. Variables with “∼” above are scenarios with no interconnector
trading, and with “−′′ represents the average over the whole period. Subscripts representing
hours are removed to simplify. We implement the following steps to estimate the counterfactual
flows:33
33The most ideal way is to include both IFA and BritNed, but it complicates the matters with negligible gain in
terms of making the post-econometric results more robust. Therefore, we analyse IFA and BritNed separately.
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1. For each hour, given the actual flows34 (m1 > 0 for importing and < 0 for exporting) and
prices (pH1 and p
F
1 ), and the marginal effects of wind on prices (θ
H
1 , θ
H
0 and θ
F , different
before and after April 2015 for H),35 we can calculate the prices when there is no trade
( p˜H1 and p˜
F
1 ) as
p˜H1 =
pH1 +m1 ·θH0 , before April 2015pH1 +m1 ·θH1 , after April 2015
p˜F1 = p
F
1 −m1θF .
2. Assuming that without trading, e1/tCO2 of the British CPS would raise h’s price by
∆pH ,36 then the prices without the CPS (τ) and trading, denoted as p˜H0 and p˜
F
0 , are
p˜H0 = p˜
H
1 −∆pH · τ,
p˜F0 = p˜
F
1 .
3. Calculate the interconnector flow where the CPS is not applied (m0) under the intercon-
nector capacity constraint (−K < m0 < K), taking the Mid Channel loss factor of the
interconnector (l) into consideration.37 Precisely,38
m0 =

K, p˜H0 · (1− l)> p˜F0 · (1+ l) and K ≤
p˜H0 − 1+l1−l ·p˜F0
1+l
1−l ·θF+θH0
,
p˜H0 − 1+l1−l ·p˜F0
1+l
1−l ·θF+θH0
, p˜H0 · (1− l)> p˜F0 · (1+ l) and K >
p˜H0 − 1+l1−l ·p˜F0
1+l
1−l ·θF+θH0
,
p˜F0− 1+l1−l ·p˜H0
1+l
1−l ·θH0 +θF
, p˜H0 · (1− l)< p˜F0 · (1+ l) and −K <
p˜F0− 1+l1−l ·p˜H0
1+l
1−l ·θH0 +θF
,
−K, p˜H0 · (1− l)< p˜F0 · (1+ l) and −K ≥
p˜F0− 1+l1−l ·p˜H0
1+l
1−l ·θH0 +θF
,
0, otherwise.
34The day-ahead scheduled IFA flow is collected from RTE.
35From Table 2, for off-peak periods, θˆH1 = 0.289, θˆ
H
0 = 1.162 and θˆ
F
= 1.898; for peak periods, θˆH1 = 1.047,
θˆH0 = 0.826 and θˆ
F
= 1.485.
36Here we assume that the CPS has no direct impact on the French price other than through trading via IFA,
which survives statistical tests as discussed in footnote 28.
37For IFA, the loss factor is l = 1.17%.
38Suppose there is no capacity limit and p˜H0 > p˜
F
0 , then equalising the prices would require
(p˜H0 −m0 ·θH0 ) · (1− l) = (p˜F0 +m0 ·θF0 ) · (1+ l),
or
m0 =
p˜H0 − 1+l1−l · p˜F0
1+l
1−l ·θF +θH0
.
The derivation is similarly for p˜H0 < p˜
F
0 .
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4. Derive the counterfactual prices under the counterfactual flows:
pH0 = p˜
H
0 −m0 ·θH0 .
pF0 = p˜
F
0 +m0 ·θF .
5. Given the actual and counterfactual prices for H and F , we can calculate the average
actual and counterfactual prices during the period of study (i.e. p¯H1 , p¯
H
0 for H, and p¯
H
1 ,
p¯H0 for F). Then, given the average CPS during the period (τ¯), the effect of the CPS on
H’s price, counting in the effect of interconnector trading, is (p¯H1 − p¯H0 )/τ¯ .
6. From Steps 1-5, the only unknown parameters is ∆pH in Step 2. Table 2 gives estimates
of the marginal effects of the CPS on H’s (GB’s) prices ( ̂∂ pH/∂τ). We iteratively adjust
the value of ∆pH in Step 2 and repeat Steps 2-5, until (p¯H1 − p¯H0 )/τ¯ in Step 5 is equal tô∂ pH/∂τ from Table 2 Regression (iii).
7. Once (p¯H1 − p¯H0 )/τ¯ and ̂∂ pH/∂τ equate, the associated flows and prices are the counter-
factual prices and flows.
Because the undiluted (by trade) effect of the CPS on the GB price (∆pH in Step 2) is
positively correlated with the diluted effect ((p¯H1 − p¯H0 )/τ¯ in Step 6, there is a unique ∆pH that
equalises ̂∂ pH/∂τ and (p¯h1− p¯H0 )/τ¯ in Step 6.
In these calculations, m1, pH1 , p
F
1 , τ , K, and l are observed, while θ
H
1 , θ
H
0 , θ
F and ∂ pH/∂τ
are estimated separately for peak and off-peak periods.
Using point estimates of θH1 , θ
H
0 , θ
F and ∂ pH/∂τ only gives point estimates of the coun-
terfactuals. To circumvent this problem, we assume that the actual values of θH1 , θ
H
0 , θ
F and
∂ pH/∂τ follow a jointly normal distribution, with mean and variance-covariances equal to the
estimated values from Regression (iii). We then apply a Monte Carlo technique to take 500
random draws from the jointly normal distribution, and for each draw, we follow Steps 1-7 to
obtain the counterfactual electricity prices and flows and hence the annual average electricity
prices, net imports and congestion income. The resulting means and the standard deviations of
the counterfactuals are reported in Table 3.
A.5 Estimating market distortion
In this subsection, we use the same 500 combinations of counterfactuals to estimate the social
value of trading and deadweight losses from asymmetric carbon taxes discussed in Section 3.2.
In addition, as the CPS does not apply to the increased GB imports, we estimate the loss in the
GB government’s carbon-tax revenue from the reduction in GB generation displaced,.
From Section 6.1 and Appendix A.4, given θˆH0 and θˆ
F
, and the estimated m0, ∆m, pF0
and pH0 , the social value is 1/2 · (θˆ
H
0 + θˆ
F
) ·m20 +m0 · (pH0 − pF0 ), and the deadweight loss
is 1/2 · (θˆH1 + θˆF1 ) ·∆m2 +∆m · (pF0 − pH0 ). Finally, the carbon-tax revenue loss is defined as
the product between the change in trading volumes (∆m) and GB’s marginal emission factors
(MEFs), µH1 , estimated yearly by Chyong et al. (2020).
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A.6 Estimating the Marginal Emission Factors for France
France is apparently well-connected to Germany, Belgium and NL and these have higher carbon
intensities, as Figure A.6 shows.
Figure A.6: Carbon intensity of electricity, 1990-2016
Table A.2 shows the shares of fossil fuels in 2017 in France and its interconnected neigh-
bours. In all these countries gas is the dominant fossil fuel, but coal was more expensive
(including the EUA price) than gas in 2017-2018. While gas is more flexible than coal, coal
might have been price-setting at least part of the time.
To investigate this further Table A.3 estimates the share of fossil fuel responses to increased
fossil demand. For the cases of Belgium, all responses at the margin come from changes in
CCGT output. In the case of Germany, Spain, and France, where there are several fossil fuels
simultaneously generating, response is measured by looking at the change of each fuel from
the previous hour compared to the change in all fossil output over that hour, adjusted to add to
100%. For Germany and Spain, most of the response is from lignite and coal, with a higher
MEF, giving the average as 0.68 tCO2/MWh and 0.48 tCO2/MWh, respectively. Our estimated
German MEF is not very different from the modelled for Germany for 2020 of 0.63 tCO2/MWh
from Bo¨ing and Regett (2019). (Northern) Italy has gas and “other” as fossil fuels. While we
have no further information on what “other” represents, we assume it is some combinations of
lignite, coal, gas and biomass, whose emission factor is half of coal and lignite. The MEF for
Italy is taken at 0.38 tCO2/MWh. Switzerland has no fossil fuels, but it is densely connected to
Germany and (Northern) Italy, hence we assume its MEF is the average of those in Germany
and Italy, or 0.53 tCO2/MWh. Finally, as Belgium is 100% gas, its MEF is taken at 0.34
tCO2/MWh.
The next step is to determine the MEF when IFA is uncongested, and that will depend on
whether is trading freely with Continental neighbours. If France’s borders are all uncongested
in any hour then it is assumed that the MEF is the average of the MEFs of the uncongested
neighbours plus France, weighted by their shares in their total fossil generation, otherwise it is
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Table A.2: Share of different fuels in generation, 2017
Country Lignite Coal Oil Gas Other
Germany 22% 11% 0% 5%
Spain 2% 15% 1% 23%
Italy 27% 42%
Belgium 0% 0 0% 27%
France 2% 0% 8%
Table A.3: Contribution of fossil fuels to flexibility, 2017
Fossil Fuels
Country Lignite Coal Oil Gas Other MEF (fossil only)
Germany 29% 45% 1% 25% 0.68
Spain 5% 31% 1% 63% 0.48
Italy 51% 49% 0.53
Switzerland 0.53
Belgium 100% 0.34
France 23% 10% 67% 0.46
the weighted average of the remaining uncongested links with France. If France is isolated then
it is just the French MEF. The results are shown in table A.4, assuming the same responsive
fossil shares in each year.
Table A.4: percent time link constrained when IFA unconstrained and MEF for France
Interconnectors
FR-BE FR-DE FR-ES FR-IT FR-CH MEF
15-16 67% 83% 53% 56% 64% 0.463
16-17 59% 73% 69% 66% 64% 0.456
17-18 60% 74% 69% 66% 65% 0.461
A.7 Estimating the impact of the CPS on BritNed
Due to data availability, our analysis on BritNed runs from January 2015 to September 2018.
Electricity load, wind and nuclear generation for The Netherlands and the net transfer capacity
of BritNed are collected from the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform. Unfortunately, there is
no reliable data source providing BritNed’s day-ahead scheduled flow. We simulate the hourly
BritNed day-ahead flow using the following algorithm:
• if both the unadjusted price differential (UPD) and adjusted price differential (APD)39
are greater (or smaller) than zero, the interconnector capacity (K) will be fully used for
importing (or exporting);
• if the APD is zero and the UPD is positive, then the day-ahead commercial exchange
would be randomly (uniformly) allocated within the interval between zero and K;
39Adjusted by the BritNed loss factor of 3%, see https://www.britned.com/about-us/operations/.
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Table A.5: M-GARCH Results, BritNed
Mean Equations
Great Britain The Netherlands
Unit Off Peak Off Peak
(Constant) −7.226∗∗ −5.675∗ −3.926 −16.54∗∗∗
(2.302) (2.332) (2.631) (3.181)
GB load GW 0.501∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.033) (0.055) (0.044)
Dutch load GW −0.111∗ 0.114∗ 0.248∗∗∗ −0.152∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.074)
GB Nuclear GW −0.681∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.027 0.239
(0.144) (0.152) (0.134) (0.194)
Dutch Nuclear GW −0.718 −2.907∗∗∗ −1.703∗∗∗ −5.061∗∗∗
(0.533) (0.549) (0.497) (0.691)
GB wind GW −0.432∗∗∗ −0.916∗∗∗ −0.051 −0.065
(0.060) (0.050) (0.063) (0.072)
Dutch wind GW −0.060 0.138 −2.377∗∗∗ −1.814∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.128) (0.157) (0.182)
BritNed capacity GW −0.862 −3.709∗∗∗ 0.087 0.991
(0.804) (0.654) (0.893) (0.810)
Coal price e/MWhe 0.326∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.034)
Gas price e/MWhe 0.804∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033)
EUA e/tCO2 0.469∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.058)
CPS e/tCO2 0.412∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.035) (0.034) (0.042) (0.046)
Conditional Variance Equations
Great Britain The Netherlands
Off Peak Off Peak
(Constant) 2.836∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 1.816∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.139) (0.394) (0.245)
ARCH 0.661∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.049) (0.063) (0.030)
GARCH 0.278∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.028) (0.071) (0.025)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p< 0.05, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
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• if the APD is zero and the UPD is negative, day-ahead flows would be randomly (uni-
formly) allocated as a negative number between −K and zero;
• if the APD and UPD have different signs, we assume the direction of flows follows that
in the previous hour, and the volume of the flow is randomly taken from the uniform
distribution between zero and K.
Due to consistency and data quality concerns, the impact of GB’s import/wind and the CPS
on the GB prices are taken from Regression (iii) in Table 2, and the impact of the Dutch wind
on its prices are taken from our new estimates for BritNed. Because of this, we will not include
interaction terms between variables and follow Regression (ii)’s specification (but excluding
the dummy variable for the French nuclear outages)40 to study the impact of the Dutch wind
on its wholesale prices. The estimation results are reported in Table A.5 as Regression (iv),
showing that during off-peak (peak) periods, a 1 GW increase in the Dutch wind generation (or
Dutch exports) is associated with a e2.4 (1.8)/MWh reduction in its off-peak(peak) wholesale
prices. The magnitudes are higher than those in GB and France mainly because the electricity
demand in The Netherlands is much lower.
Table A.6: Statistical Measurements for BrtiNed: prices, flows, and congestion revenue
Electricity GB Prices ( e/MWh) Dutch Prices ( e/MWh)
years w. CPS w/o CPS ∆ w. CPS w/o CPS ∆
15-16 e53.24 e40.52 e12.72 e36.25 e35.24 e1.01
(0.93) (0.93) (0.14) (0.14)
16-17 e51.76 e40.70 e11.07 e35.98 e35.01 e0.97
(0.81) (0.81) (0.14) (0.14)
17-18 e52.70 e42.24 e10.46 e39.87 e38.80 e1.07
(0.77) (0.77) (0.13) (0.13)
Ave.(15-18) e52.57 e41.15 e11.42 e37.37 e36.35 e1.02
(0.84) (0.84) (0.13) (0.13)
GB Net Import (TWh) Congestion Income (m e)
w. CPS w/o CPS ∆ w. CPS w/o CPS ∆
15-16 8.21 TWh 3.49 TWh 4.72 TWh e134 e60 e74
(0.58) (0.58) (3.31) (3.31)
16-17 7.28 TWh 2.71 TWh 4.57 TWh e121 e68 e53
(0.56) (0.56) (2.34) (2.34)
17-18 7.14 TWh 2.11 TWh 5.03 TWh e97 e51 e46
(0.50) (0.50) (1.94) (1.94)
Ave.(15-18) 7.54 TWh 2.77 TWh 4.77 TWh e117 e59 e58
(0.54) (0.54) (2.51) (2.51)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note that Table A.5 can be used as a robustness check for our IFA study in Table 2. Both
studies show some similar magnitudes for the slope coefficients of GB wind, coal and gas
prices, as well as EU and British carbon price impacts on GB prices. Perhaps surprisingly, we
40The dummy variable is not statistically significant even if we include it in the regressions.
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find the CPS has a negative impact on off-peak Dutch prices. The could be that the data only
allow us to have few observations with a CPS of £9.55/tCO2. Estimates of the effects of the
CPS on the wholesale prices are vulnerable to unexpected shocks — for example, the winter
of 2016 was one of the warmest in Dutch history, resulting in less domestic heating load and
lower electricity prices. Fortunately, this would not affect our post-econometric analysis as we
assume that without interconnector trading, the impacts of the CPS on the foreign wholesale
prices are zero.
Using the result from Tables 2 and A.5, and applying the same steps as Section A.4, Table
A.6 reports the counterfactuals of the GB and Dutch wholesale prices, as well as the net import
and congestion income of BritNed. Our results for BritNed are cosistent with our IFA analy-
sis in Section 6.1-6.3. During electricity years 2015-2018, the CPS on average raised Dutch
wholesale prices by e1.02/MWh, or about 2.8%. About 63% (4.77 TWh) of GB’s net import
from The Netherlands is due to the CPS, and the associated congestion income almost doubled
from e59 m/yr to e117 m/yr.
Table A.7: BritNed: surplus, distortion and losses
Electricity Social Deadweight GB CPS Rev.
years Value (m e) Loss (m e) Loss (m e)
15-16 e78 e40.6 e47.2
(3.69) (5.17) (5.76)
16-17 e85 e37.1 e35.4
(2.70) (4.41) (4.44)
17-18 e68 e39.6 e34.8
(2.15) (4.60) (3.51)
Ave. 15-18 e77 e39.1 e39.2
(2.83) (4.73) (4.55)
Standard errors in parentheses.
The effects of the CPS on the Dutch price, GB’s net import and congestion revenue from
BritNed are more than half of those from our IFA estimates. Although BritNed is half the size
of IFA, the slope of the Dutch supply curve (measured by the impact of wind on the Dutch
price) is steeper than GB and France because of its smaller electricity load. Table A.7 further
shows that during electricity years 2015-2018, the social value of BritNed is e77 m/yr and the
deadweight loss is e39.1 m/yr, about half of the social value of IFA’s social value and about
the same size of the IFA loss. The UK government has lost about e39.2 million worth of tax
revenue, or about 4% of its total CPF receipts in 2017.
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